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Abstract
The goal of this article is to examine the relationship between unrelated diversification and
performance. Results indicate that diversified firms, investing in activities far from the core
business, have high performance. Unrelated diversification positively affects firms’
performance. In addition, the estimation methods applied are fundamental in order to verify if
there are endogeneity problems in the diversification decision and evaluate the effective role
of diversification on performance.
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1. Introduction
This paper deals with the traditional but still controversial debate regarding the relationship
between product diversification strategies and a firm’s value. Till the end of the nineties the
vast majority of Corporate Finance studies assumed a negative effect of diversification on
performance, while the Strategic Management literature highlighted the contribution of
diversification to value creation processes. In recent years a growing number of studies have
shown a renewed interest among the scientific community in this area of research (Campa &
Kedia 2002; Graham, Lemmon & Wolf 2002; Maksimovic & Phillips 2002; Singh,
Nejadmalayeri & Mathur 2007; Villalonga 2004a; 2004b). Substantial empirical work
confirms the existence of a relationship between corporate diversification and firm value,
although there is no consensus on the negative or positive direction of this relationship
(Martin & Sayrak 2003; Palich, Cardinal & Miller 2000; Villalonga 2003). Therefore,
continued efforts to clarify the association between firm diversification and firm performance
are useful.
Financial studies offer two competing theoretical perspectives providing theoretical
motivations for diversification3: agency costs theory and efficient view of corporate
diversification.
The first perspective, based on the search for private benefits explanations, considers
diversification as a decision taken for opportunistic reasons (Jensen 1986; Jensen & Meckling
1976; Shleifer & Vishny 1989). According to the agency theory, diversification can somehow
exacerbate opportunistic problems, resulting from the pursuit of managerial self-interest at
the expense of stockholders (Fama & Jensen 1983). This explanation is consistent with a
negative effect of diversification on firm performance. Many authors (Aggarwal & Samwick
2003; Berger & Ofek 1995; Denis, Denis & Sarin 1997; Lang & Stulz 1994) have shown that
firm value decreases in diversification for this reason. In particular unrelated diversification
might be consistent with agency theory, which could explain why diversified firms,
especially conglomerates, make less profit and have a lower market value.
The second perspective concerns the benefits of corporate diversification. It is argued
that the extent of corporate diversification is related to the level of information asymmetry
between managers and outside investors (Hadlock, Ryngaer & Shawn 2001; Thomas 2002).
From this perspective, according to Myers and Majluf (1984), problems of asymmetric
information are often less severe for diversified firms than for focused firms. In addition,
according to efficiency of the internal capital markets (Rajan, Servaes & Zingales 2000: Stein
1997), there should be a coinsurance effect derived from combining businesses whose cash
flows are less than perfectly correlated, providing a tax benefit related to the fact that the tax
liability of the diversified firm may be less than the cumulated tax liabilities of the different
business units (Lewellen 1971). Specifically, unrelated diversification is associated with the
financial synergies hypothesis, which states that firms diversify to benefit from the
economies of an internal capital market and an internal labour market, to obtain tax benefits,
and to reduce business risk (coinsurance argument).
These are two competing arguments that, although both based on managerial
discretion, consider diversification decisions, in particular the one based on unrelated
businesses, differently as an output of opportunistic behaviours, or as a means for fostering
firms’ efficiency. According to prominent literature, the effect of diversification on
performance is expected to be particularly relevant when taking into consideration firms that
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Research work explaining why firms diversify, in management, financial and economic literature, is
synthesised by Montgomery (1994).
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diversify into business segments dissimilar to the firm’s core business, showing different
industries’ features (Kim et al. 2009; Lins & Servaes 1999; Palich, Cardinal & Miller 2000).
The goal of this study is to analyse the effectiveness of the prediction of the main
literature in explaining the performance implications of unrelated diversification, and to
verify which of the relationships – i.e. positive, negative - prevails as a general (net) effect.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the context of analysis. Section
3 provides information about the methodology and the variables used. Section 4 reports the
descriptive statistics of the data. The results of our empirical analysis are presented in Section
5. The conclusions follow in Section 6.
2. Context of Analysis
The Italian economic environment presents a large number of elements of inefficiency in the
allocation of funds. Capital markets in Italy are relatively undeveloped compared not only to
those in the US but also, to some extent, to those of other large European countries. The stock
market is not an important source of finance in Italy. Corporate debt is not issued on the
market, but is often raised through banks and other financial institutions. Due to the lack of
transparency regulations and high information asymmetries, contract costs between
borrowers and lenders are high. In particular, benefits provided by diversification strategies,
arising from the internal capital market, can be extremely relevant in the presence of
significant external capital market constraint and imperfections.
Another feature of the Italian economy is that, in most cases, the Italian model of
corporate governance is quite different to the one proposed by Berle and Means (1932).
Families represent an important class of large shareholders. In particular, family firms face
severe agency problems that arise between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. If
the large shareholder is an individual or a family, it is potentially greater the incentives to
both extract private benefits at the expense of the small shareholders and monitor the firm.
This agency problem is likely to be exacerbated in the presence of a context such as Italy,
with weak disclosure requirements and governance mechanisms and a poorly developed
financial market (Faccio & Lang 2002; La Porta et al. 1998; La Rocca et al. 2009).
In the light of these arguments, Italian firms represent an interesting case study to
verify the value of diversification, because of a context characterised by market inefficiency
with considerable asymmetric information, and where whoever is in control has considerable
discretionary power to use financial resources, even for opportunistic behaviours.
3. Methodology and Variables
To verify empirically the effect on corporate performance of unrelated diversification, the
following model is estimated.
(1)
Performance it = f (D_DivUnrel it, Control Variables it)
The corporate performance of firm i at time t is a function of diversification unrelated
(D_DivUnrel) and a set of control variables.
Since the stock market in Italy, as in other continental European countries, is not an
important source of finance and very few Italian companies trade publicly, not even companies
that are quite large (e.g. Ferrero, Fininvest, Barilla), we take into consideration an accountingbased measure of performance (Palich et al. 2000; Singh et al. 2007; Wan & Hoskisson
2003). Similar to Jiraporn et al. (2008) we use a relative performance measure; more
specifically, we measure operating performance (Ind-rel ROA) as the industry-adjusted ratio
of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation (EBITDA) to total assets
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(Denis & Kruse 2000). We adjust each firm's operating performance by subtracting the
median ratio of EBITDA to assets for all other companies having the same two-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) code.
Diversification is proxied by a dummy diversification unrelated (D_DivUnrel), that is
a binary variable taking a value of one if the firm diversifies in unrelated businesses (at least
one business division has to be different at 2-digit SIC code), and zero otherwise.
Theoretical and empirical studies have shown that leverage, ownership concentration,
tangibility, age and growth opportunities affect corporate performance and these have also
been included in the model. Moreover, a dummy family and a dummy listing are also
included.
We use different methods to examine the effect of unrelated diversification on firm
performance. First, we use an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. A possible concern
with the analysis is that D_DivUnrel and error term in equation (1) may be correlated. In this
case, OLS estimations generate biased estimates (Campa & Kedia 2002; Villalonga 2004a).
We use three econometric methods each of which addresses the endogeneity problem from a
different perspective. To avoid unobservable firm heterogeneity we use a fixed-effect
estimator (FE). In addition, we apply the instrumental variables estimation (IV) to examine
the underlying causal relation. Finally, we use the treatment estimator to verify if there is
self-section bias (Heckman)4. The additional instruments used in the last two cases include
industry and time dummies and macroeconomic indicators such as the overall economic
growth (log of GDP).
4. Data and Descriptives
The sample consisted of a panel made up of 229 Italian firms, listed and unlisted, evaluated in
the period from 1980 to 2007 (28 years). Firms belonging to the financial-services industry,
which present specific features that make them difficult to compare to other firms, and firms
belonging to the regulated utilities industries, which at the beginning of the period were
government-owned but then were involved in a privatisation process, were excluded. The
hand-collected data were provided by Mediobanca - Ricerche & Studi (R&S). This is a
unique database, created using the R&S paper-based reports until 2000, and the PDF-files up
to 2007. The whole sample comprised 2,613 observations. Table 1 shows the descriptive
statistics for the variables used in the analysis.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the variables
Variables
Ind-rel ROA
D_DivUnrel
Leverage
Own.Conc.
D_Family
D_Listing
Tangibility
Age
Growth Opp.
Observations

Mean

Median

St.Dev.

Min

Max

0.212
0.260
0.434
0.657
0.594
0.339
0.355
3.437
0.105
2,613

0.00
0
0.441
0.633
1
0
0.332
3.638
0.0630

0.148
0.439
0.237
0.263
0.491
0.474
0.168
0.958
0.350

-0.425
0
0
0.00760
0
0
0.000190
0
-0.959

0.992
1
1
1
1
1
1
4.913
9.527

4

Compared to the standard Heckman model, treatment effects models, in the performance equation, consider
the dummy variable D_DivUnrel as additional variable. For details on this point see Li and Prabhale (2007).
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Considering descriptive statistics for the whole sample, approximately 26% of the
firms diversify in unrelated businesses. Some variables, such as debt, seem to be
symmetrically distributed while others, such as growth opportunity, are asymmetrically
distributed.
5. Results
This section presents the results of the analysis. Table 2 shows the results of four regressions
that characterise the relationship between diversification and performance. In particular, Indrel ROA is the proxy used to measure industry-adjusted firm’s performance.
Table 2
The effect of unrelated diversification on firm performance
Variables
D_DivUnrel
Leverage
Own.Conc.
D_Family
D_Listing
Tangibility
Age
Growth Opp.
Constant

Observations
Adjusted R2
F-statistic (p-value)
Lambda (p-value)
Hausman test (p-value)

(OLS)
(1)

(FE)
(2)

(IV)
(3)

(Heckman)
(4)

-0.008*
(0.004)
-0.154***
(0.008)
0.013
(0.009)
0.009**
(0.004)
-0.031***
(0.005)
-0.035***
(0.012)
-0.010***
(0.002)
0.070***
(0.006)
0.110***
(0.012)

-0.034***
(0.013)
-0.231***
(0.013)
0.020
(0.012)
-0.044
(0.027)
-0.046***
(0.011)
-0.095***
(0.023)
-0.031***
(0.007)
0.031***
(0.006)
0.299***
(0.030)

0.060*
(0.032)
-0.247***
(0.016)
0.046***
(0.013)
0.005
(0.006)
-0.050***
(0.006)
-0.078***
(0.017)
-0.014***
(0.003)
0.030**
(0.014)
0.168***
(0.017)

0.049*
(0.027)
-0.244***
(0.013)
0.044***
(0.012)
0.005
(0.006)
-0.049***
(0.007)
-0.014***
(0.003)
-0.076***
(0.017)
0.030***
(0.008)
0.170***
(0.017)

2611
0.191
76.96(0.00)

2612
0.145
50.37 (0.00)

2612
0.155
53.22 (0.000)

2612

-0.032**(0.016)
224.97 (0.000)

Notes: Ind-rel ROA defined as firm’s ROA minus industry (2-digit SIC code) median ROA. (*), (**) and (***) indicates
that coefficients are significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Lambda, if significant, indicates the prevalence of
self-selection and suggests that characteristics that make firms choose to diversify are negatively correlated with firm value.
To test for the existence of endogeneity, we use Hausman’s test (Hausman 1978). This test is based on the difference
between the OLS estimator and the IV estimator.

The results in regressions (1) to (2), based on OLS specification and the fixed effect
model alternatively, are qualitatively similar. The variable D_DivUnrel shows a negative and
significant coefficient, indicating that unrelated diversified firms have low performance
compared to other firms.
The results in regressions (3) and (4) show a changed sign of the variable
D_DivUnrel, while all the other explanatory variables for the most part maintain similar
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effects. Regression (3), in which IV estimator is considered, shows that the coefficient of the
instrumented D_DivUnrel, is significant and positive. Finally, regression (4), in which an
endogenous self-selection model is considered, also shows that the coefficient on
D_DivUnrel, is significant and positive. These results suggest that after accounting for
endogeneity problems, with both the instrumental variables and self-selection models, the
impact of unrelated diversification on a firm’s performance is positive. This implies that the
decision to diversify unrelated is made in the shareholders’ best interest. These results are
consistent with the efficient view of corporate diversification, which suggests that managers
invest efficiently in unrelated diversification. In general, in order to evaluate the impact of
diversification on firm value it is of great importance to verify the endogeneity of the
diversification decision.
6. Conclusions
The results reveal the predominant role of the efficient view argument; that is, the benefits of
diversification outweigh its costs (mainly based on opportunistic problems). In an
institutional context like the Italian one, full of frictions and inefficiencies, firms mainly
diversify for financial purposes, to reduce asymmetric information problems and to obtain
benefits from the creation of internal capital markets. Empirically, the estimation methods
applied are fundamental in checking if there are endogeneity problems in the diversification
decision and in evaluating the effective role of diversification on a firm’s performance.
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